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The Energy Transition: Challenges and Opportunities for Russia

A Study

August 2024

Summary: successful energy transition will depend on the accelerated commercialization and integration of technologies of the future



- The ongoing global energy transition is driven by **long-term fundamental**, **irreversible factors**. The turbulent recent years have given it a new impetus toward **energy security and accessibility** in the emerging multipolar world
- Global demand for primary energy is expected to climb 22% by the year 2050, with electricity consumption set to nearly double. Meanwhile, the deficit of critical materials, the need for substantial investment, and unreadiness of most new technologies for commercial utilization combine to lend a **non-linear quality** to the energy transition, creating the potential for a first mover advantage. A window of opportunity thus opens, and it can be taken advantage of
- Even if the optimal scenario, which is the Rational Balance scenario, takes hold, primary energy derived from fossil fuels will account for about 55% of the world's energy, and 75% in Russia by 2050, which is to say that fossil fuels will remain the dominant source of energy. The "greening" of fossil fuels and advancement of commercially viable beyond-the-horizon technologies form the groundwork of success, however, the structure of the energy system will depend on the local features of individual nations and regions



- In the baseline scenario, Russia's fuel mix will be changing inertially. To use the window of opportunity, Russia will have to advance in these three key areas
- **Energy sovereignty:** closing the strategic gaps in raw materials, technology, supply- and demand-side supply chains, and availability of workforce and financing
- Infrastructure for accelerated growth of domestic demand (including the priority development hubs in the Arctic and the Far East) and electric vehicles, to be developed by private sector players in partnership with the state
- Advancement of new low-carbon energy options: a breakthrough by dint of economies of scale, made possible in part by international partnerships and by integrating technologies into turn-key energy solutions for the domestic and international markets



- The solution for Russian energy utilities may be defined as "dual-speed management"
- The idea is to strike a balance between win-win moves and strategic bets, on the one hand, assuring **stable**, effective, and sustainable business today,
- and on the other hand, taking advantage of the window of opportunity to press ahead with technological development in order to secure a strategic edge
- To that end, Russia must accept these five management imperatives: scenario planning, dynamic portfolio management decision-making, ecosystem approach, focus on long-term value, and an adaptive operating model



Agenda

The energy landscape is changing: what's going on?

D2 Challenges and opportunities for Russia: what does this mean?

03 New strategy planning imperatives: what is to be done?

Driven by long-term fundamental, irreversible factors, the energy transition leads to a radical reshaping of the supply-demand patterns

Fundamental drivers

Community

- Population growth (9.7 billion by 2050)
- Urbanization (up to 80% of the population ٠ lives in urban areas)
- Changes in energy's value for consumers

Economics

- Industrialization and de/reindustrialization
- Changing GDP energy intensity
- Convergence of industries

Environment and climate

- Fighting climate change: the drive to reduce emissions from 58 Gt CO₂e to 0
- Resource conservation: fostering a closed • loop economy

Global politics

- Geopolitical barriers, international institutions and leadership in crisis
- Renewable energy sources
- Small nuclear power plants
- Carbon capture, utilization and storage, including direct air capture (DAC) 3.

4D trends

 \rightarrow

Decarbonization

Reducing emissions by launching/ decommissioning demand generators and power generating facilities

Decentralization

- Generating facilities moving closer to ٠ consumers
- Local market growth ٠

Digitalization

- AI and big data technology for improved performance
- Flexible smart grids ٠

Deglobalization

- Nations, local communities, and ٠ households striving toward energy self-sufficiency
- Resource nationalism

Changes in global energy mix

On the supply side

Broader use of clean energy generating and storing technology (RES¹, SNPP², CCUS³, collectors, etc.)

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"Greening" of fossil fuels

Advancements in low-carbon fuel technology (hydrogen, synthetic fuels, \sim natural gas, etc.)

On the demand side



Increased energy usage and energy efficiency



Transportation sector switching to electric motors



Electrification of industries and households

The past few turbulent years have radically reshaped the world and will impact the future energy markets

How geopolitical events impact energy supply chains and investment

- Global Supply Chain Pressure Index, % - Global Energy Price Index, nominal US\$1

The world as we knew it Economies of scale Effective global supply Shareholder value Consumption by the "golden billion" in manufacturing chains above all and resource provision 340 4,0 SMO starts 320 3,5 300 280 3,0 260 240 2,5 220 COVID-19 2,0 200 pandemic 180 1,5 160 Arab 140 Spring 1,0 120 US-China trade 0,5 Global 100 war kicks off 80 economic 0,0 60 crisis BREXIT Israel-Palestine 40 -0,5 conflict 20 -1,0 0 2000 2005 2016 2018 2020 2022 2023 2008-2009 2011

The world we are headed for



Disrupted supply chains, a multipolar economic landscape



- Tendency to stave off risks by building sovereign energy ecosystems
- Growing tendency
 to prioritize friendly nations for energy deals



Emphasis on affordable, sustainable energy as the bedrock of long-term value for society

1. Base year = 2016, index = 100

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Bloomberg; public sources

The rise in global demand for primary energy will be driven by population growth and increasing per capita consumption in developing economies

Developed economies¹ Developing economies

Global average

Population, bn



Per capita primary energy consumption, GJ



According to the UN classification

Source: World Bank; DNV; International Energy Agency; OECD Data Explorer; ExxonMobil Global Outlook 2024; Yakov and Partners analysis

Comments

- According to estimates, **the world's** ()population stands to increase by more than 20% by the year 2050, with population growth driven primarily by the developing nations. Per capita consumption will also increase, driving global demand for resources, energy included
- The developed economies will see fossil 02fuels getting progressively substituted by electricity or renewable alternatives in transportation, manufacturing, and households, which will be accompanied by improvements in energy efficiency
- There will be only a limited substitution 03 effect in the developing economies, therefore, the **rise** in energy demand and consumption will be driven by industrialization of the growing regions and expanded opportunities for consumers

Aggregate demand for electric power is set to increase 1.7 times across all sectors by 2050



2. Including electrolysis

Source: Energy Institute 2024, DNV (Energy Transition Outlook 2023); IEA; McKinsey & Company; Yakov and Partners analysis

Comments

O1 Consumption of electricity, which has consistently increased in percentage terms vs aggregate primary energy consumption, will account for over 35% of the lot by 2050 vs 26% in 2023

02 Growth drivers

- More electric vehicles and a greater percentage of EVs in the overall car fleet
- Electrification of low- and mediumtemperature industrial processes
- Advances in electrolysis technologies for the production of green hydrogen and synthetic fuels (ammonia, methanol, etc.)
- Rising household demand for electricity, contributed in part by air conditioning and heating needs
- 03 The developing economies' contribution to global electricity consumption will climb from **59% in 2022 to 66% in 2050**

The energy transition will be seriously impeded by the deficit of critical metals

Demand
 Supply

Demand and supply year on year, '000 t



1. Lithium carbonate equivalent

Source: Critical Minerals Data Explorer; IEA; EY (US Energy Transition Narrative); McKinsey (Lithium mining, 2022)

Comments



2 By the year 2030, global demand for critical minerals is expected to exceed supply by 10% to 20%

03 This will lead to price hikes and tougher competition over access to these resources

Localization of critical metal resources, coupled with a worsening geopolitical situation, may fuel resource nationalism

Critical element reserves, mining, and processing capacity (2023)

Lithium			Copper			Nickel			Rare earth metals		
Reserves, Mt Mined, '000 t			Reserves, Mt 📃 Mined, '000 t			Reserves, Mt 📄 Mined, '000 t			Reserves, Mt Mined, '000 t		
Chile	9.3	44	Chile	190	5.0	Indonesia	55.0	1.8	China	44.0	240
Australia	6.2	86	Peru	120	2.6	Australia	24.0	0.2	Vietnam	22.0	1
Argentina	3.6	10	Australia	100	0.8	Brazil	16.0	0.1	Brazil	21.0	0
China	3.0	33	Congo	80	2.5	Russia	8.3	0.2	Russia	10.0	3
USA	1.1	0	Russia	80	0.9	New Caledonia	7.1	0.2	India	6.9	3
Canada	0.9	3	Mexico	53	0.8	Philippines	4.8	0.4	Australia	5.7	18
Brazil	0.4	5	USA	50	1.1	China	4.2	0.1	USA	1.8	43
Zimbabwe	0.3	3	China	41	1.7	Canada	2.2	0.2	Greenland	1.5	0
Portugal	0.1	0	Poland	34	0.4	USA	0.3	0.0	Tanzania	0.9	0
Other countries	2.8	0	Other countries	253	5.8	Other countries	9.1	0.4	Other countries	0.0	42
Total	28	184	Total	1 001	22	Total	131	3.6	Total	113	350
Note											

China controls 40% of copper processing and mines 70% of rare earth metals and 15% of lithium. Australia controls 46% of lithium mining Indonesia is the world's largest nickel producer with a share of **about 50%**, however, most of its nickel is of inferior quality and **unfit for use** in the energy sector Geopolitical factors and increasing propensity of nations to control their own natural resources may shrink the supply, creating further challenges for the global energy market

Most of the promising new technologies are at a low level of maturity and have ways to go before they are fit for commercial use

🔘 Size matches the required investment 🛛 🔵 Energy generation technologies 👘 Energy storage technologies 👘 Auxiliary technologies

Technology's potential in the energy transition context



1. Electrochemical accumulators and converters of energy, mostly that of hydrogen

2. This technology permits electric vehicles to return energy to the electric grid for subsequent redistribution on the market (Vehicle-to-Grid)

3. Electric vehicle charging while on the move

4. Carbon capture, utilization and storage, (CCUS), including direct air capture (DAC)

Source: public sources; expert interviews; Yakov and Partners analysis

The current efforts to reduce the contribution and carbon intensity of fossil fuels will not be enough to limit global warming to below 2°C

Emissions: other forms of human impact

Emissions: energy

Steps to mitigate climate change impact Annual average global emissions, CO₂e, Gt Advances in clean energy technologies, namely RES and NPP, will help reduce CO₂ emissions to a limited 58 extent only To counteract the remaining 64% of CO₂ equivalent emissions from fossil fuels, the following actions will be required 20 On the supply side ~ +2.6 °C Reduce the carbon intensity of power generation, 36 such as by stepping up the retirement of old coal-fired thermal power stations 30 -36% • Promote the development of **CCUS**¹ technologies 24 Build a **closed loop economy** On the demand side 38 Raise the energy efficiency and electrification coverage of different economic sectors Households: deploy heat pumps, solar batteries, energy storage systems, etc. < +2 °C • Transportation: promote electric vehicles and the use NZE goals of hydrogen fuel directly at production site Manufacturing: use "green" steel, cement, methanol, ammonia, and other chemical products 2023 2030 2040 2050

1. Carbon capture, utilization and storage, (CCUS), including direct air capture (DAC)

Source: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC); Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research; UN Emission Gap Report 2023; IEA

Global temperature rise

(XX)

Investment in energy transition technologies has reached the minimum level required to sustain the transition, but 1.6 times more investment is needed to achieve NZE

Power generation technologies



Cumulative investment needed to implement energy transition throughout 2022–2050¹, US\$ trillion

including direct air capture (DAC)

2. Including oil, gas, and coal

Source: BloombergNEF (New Energy Outlook 2023); Yakov and Partners analysis

8. Averaged value

In view of the necessary changes and the apparent risks, two key development scenarios may be identified for the global energy mix

Scenario assumptions

	Rational Balance (baseline scenario)	Accelerated Deglobalization 2
	The energy portfolio evolves in alignment with the environmental and economic interests concerned	Polarization of the world and disintegration of energy supply chains cause the energy transition to slow down considerably
Geopolitical tensions	Geopolitical stabilization Cooperation between new regional alliances of a multipolar world paves the way for Globalization 2.0	Continued polarization in politics, economics, and technological development Preexisting supply chains disrupted
Worldwide economic development	Moderate global economic growth (1.5% to 2% annually)	Global economy stagnates until 2030, followed by slow growth
Technological development	Radical technological breakthroughs on the horizon (before 2030) Technology transfer opportunities taken advantage of to achieve economies of scale within the available partnerships	No technology transfer; technological breakthrough never happens or is local in nature so that no opportunity arises to benefit from economies of scale
Consumer activism and the green agenda	New generation changes consumer habits in favor of sustainable environmental practices Massive investments in the energy transition by the US, EU, and China, with other nations following suit to varying degrees	Communities prioritize immediate access to energy resources at all costs All nations prioritize energy security, economic viability is secondary
Regulatory framework	The energy transition gets economic and social incentives from international institutions and other parties	Inertia persists, leadership crisis continues in international institutions
Access to critical supplies	Critical supplies are shared within the newly formed supply chains	The developed economies have the technology but no necessary resources; the developing economies have the resources but no technology to develop them

The share of fossil fuels will decline, but no single energy transition technology will gain dominance

Nuclear power

RES¹

Natural gas 📃 Coal

Global demand for primary energy by fuel type, EJ



Comments

In the baseline scenario, RES and nuclear power generating capacities will triple; however, fossil fuels will continue to contribute ~55% (down a quarter vs current level)

In the Accelerated Deglobalization scenario, energy consumption growth will slow down by a factor of 3.5, with hydrocarbons contributing upwards of 60%

Renewable energy alternatives will not solve the problem entirely in any scenario

The "greening" of fossil fuels and advancement of **new generation technologies beyond the confines of** commercial utility **and into the realm of technological breakthrough** will be the cornerstone of success for energy transition

1. Including wind, solar, hydroelectric, and geothermal power, biofuels, and hydrogen

Source: Energy Institute 2024; IEA (World Energy Outlook 2023); DNV; Yakov and Partners analysis

The share of clean energy will be the first to shrink from geopolitical impact as resources are mobilized and restrictions placed on technology and partnership

Situation in the global market for primary energy by fuel type, including demand (EJ)

	Rational Balance	2050	Accelerated Deglobalization 2050			
Nuclear power	Nuclear power's share to rise to 9% or 10% from the current 4% through deploying more Gen III+ and IV SNPPs The nuclear powers launch new NPP units, commercialize nuclear power technologies	753 71	646 36	Deployment of new SNPPs impeded by lack of scale Previously planned, localized new NPP projects go ahead, fusion power remains merely a hypothetical generating alternative		
Pres ¹	Solar generation grows in the US and China, wind generation thrives in the EU Developing economies deploy renewable energy generation if deemed economically viable	263	199	RES advancement is mostly driven by the EU and China The US and nations in the Asia-Pacific region scale back new project development and domestic investment, falling back on their available fossil fuel reserves		
Oil	Demand is down in the transportation sector following massive rollout of electric vehicles Growing consumption in the petrochemical industry fails to make up for the slump in the transportation sector	151	156	Greenfield development is suspended due to lack of investment Demand shrinks in the wake of electric vehicle rollout in the developed economies and China		
Natural) gas	Consumption rises and share in the energy mix remains at the same level Acts as an interim, "cleaner" fuel in the energy transition	166	148	Share in the energy mix is maintained by commissioning new, previously planned LNG capacity Greenfield development is suspended due to lack of investment		
Coal	The US, EU, Japan, South Korea, and China see a 50%– 70% decline in coal use, while demand remains largely unchanged in India and Southeast Asia	102	107	Being the low cost option, coal remains a sought-after fuel for developing economies		

1. Including wind, solar, hydroelectric, and geothermal power, biofuels, and hydrogen

Source: Yakov and Partners analysis

The global energy mix will depend on national and regional differences and the rational choices made by countries and regions

Changes in primary energy generation share in the energy mix of selected regions by 2050



Achieving energy sovereignty in a new reality requires a concerted, systematic impact upon the fundamental factors

Community

- Focus on trends contributing to climate change and irrational use of resources
- Due consideration to demographic change: stratification of society, overurbanization, and migration
- Consumer engagement

Economy and technology

- Reshaping of demand structure sector-to-sector
- Accelerated commercialization of emerging technologies of promise by engineering economies of scale
- Shift of focus from shareholder value to long-term value

Environment and regulators' role

- Support for the advancement of forward-looking technologies for energy transition, and investments in clean energy and "greening" of fossil fuels
- Efforts to encourage carbon market growth
- Support for the Paris Agreement climate action initiatives and carbon emission reduction commitments



- Cementing of the energy and technological sovereignty
- Ecosystem cooperation between friendly nations
 - to foster economies of scale and expedite the development and implementation of forward-looking technologies
 - to reduce exposure to supply chain risks and dependency on resource nationalism
- Promoting the growth of supranational institutions







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1 The energy landscape is changing: what's going on?

02 Challenges and opportunities for Russia: what does this mean?

03 New strategy planning imperatives: what is to be done?

Russia's fuel mix will be changing inertially in the years up to 2050

Nuclear power RES¹

Natural gas 📃 Coal

Oil

Russia's domestic demand for primary energy by fuel type, EJ



Comments

Russia is replacing its fossil fuels at a markedly slower pace than the rest of the world In the baseline scenario, their share is expected to drop from the current 86% to ~75% by 2050, versus a global average of ~55%

Russia's electricity consumption will be increasing at an annual rate of 2%, compared to 2.2% in the rest of the world

The consumption mix will change as Siberian thermal power plants switch from coal to natural gas following the launch of Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline and further development of renewable energy alternatives and nuclear power plants

New technology **development is imperative** for both **clean energy production** and **"greening" of fossil fuels**

The Accelerated Deglobalization scenario will see domestic consumption shrink while the respective shares of different fuel types will remain practically the same in the 2050 energy mix

1. Including wind, solar, hydroelectric, and geothermal power, biofuels, and hydrogen

Source: Energy Institute; Rosstat; Yakov and Partners analysis

High-tech development and new project launches must be prioritized if fossil fuel export volumes are to be maintained

Russia's primary energy exports, EJ



Comments

Natural das

Coal

In the Rational Balance scenario, high export volumes can be maintained if oil and gas production returns to the previous level, provided that the ongoing new projects are completed, namely:

- Power of Siberia gets filled to capacity, Power of Siberia 2 goes into operation
- Proprietary technologies are developed (LC LNG¹, oilfield services)
- Russia expands its own fleet of ice-class vessels
- New export destinations are explored and logistical bottlenecks are eliminated (Eastern Polygon, Northern Sea Route, infrastructure construction in the Arctic and the Far Eastern Federal District)

In the Accelerated Deglobalization scenario, exports will decline 18% due to the lack of mining technology and essential logistics infrastructure

1. Large-capacity natural gas liquefaction

Source: Energy Institute; Rosstat; Yakov and Partners analysis

Mounting geopolitical pressure may impair Russia's energy potential

Situation in Russia's primary energy market by fuel type, including demand and export (EJ)

Consumption Export

	Rational Balance	2050	Accelerated Deglobalization 20	050
Nuclear power	 Launch of new Gen IV NPP units Full-scale operation of Gen III+ SNPPs for remote regions kicks off The nuclear fuel cycle is closed 	32.9 4.1	 Launch of new NPP units is delayed Reduced demand for electric power translates into reduced investment in nuclear power development Gen III+ SNPPs operate at partial capacity 	
PRES ¹	 Economically viable renewable energy generating assets - solar and wind farms, small hydro projects - are launched to serve, in particular, the more energy-deficient and remote regions Hydrogen is produced in priority development hubs 	3.7	 2.7 The previously announced RES projects – solar and wind farms small hydroelectric plants – are completed and launched, but new projects are deferred on account of new technologies an investments being inaccessible 	s, 1d
oil	 Russia adapts to export restrictions and insufficient fleet, enters new markets Domestic consumption drops in the transportation sector and so does generation after 2030 	5.7 12.0	 Projects are only marginally profitable as key importers of Rus oil impose predatory pricing There is no sufficient domestic investment to develop hard-to reach fields Slower consumption decline in the transportation sector 	;sian)-
Natural M gas ²	 Gas infrastructure is extended to more regions Domestic manufacturing of combined cycle gas turbines substitutes imports Demand rises for chemicals derived from natural gas: fertilizers and synthetic fuels Deferred implementation of Arctic LNG 2 and new fields, expansion of the Northern Sea Route 	17.6 12.7	 16.8 Pomestic manufacturing of combined cycle gas turbines fails Coal is not substituted in power generation Gas consumption drops in manufacturing New major projects in natural gas-based chemical industry are stalled The Northern Sea Route never reaches full capacity for lack of demand 	e f
ື≝_ Coal	 Demand declines slowly due to lower efficiency and higher CAPEX requirements at coal-fired power plants compared to gas-fired ones Transportation restrictions are lifted (Eastern Polygon) Greening technologies begin to be applied to coal 	1.8 3.0	 China's and India's energy imports decline, and Russia has to compete with Indonesia Cross-border regulations make export look less attractive whe commodities are mined using obsolete equipment 	en

1. Including wind, solar, hydroelectric, and geothermal power, biofuels, and hydrogen

2. Including capacities reserved for the production of blue hydrogen with CCUS

Source: Energy Institute; Rosstat; Yakov and Partners analysis

The realistic scenario offers a three-way window of opportunity for Russian companies



01

Securing energy sovereignty and the safe, robust, and efficient use of energy resources today



02

Promoting domestic demand, sustainable land development: securing access to generating assets and grids, revitalization in the Arctic regions and the Far East, accelerating the spread of electric vehicles



03

Development of forward-looking technologies in ecosystem partnerships with other nations in order to secure technological cooperation and economies of scale, stepping up entry into developing economies

Technology, equipment, and supply chains are the more vulnerable aspects of the drive toward energy sovereignty

Risk matrix of the Russian energy sector Risk level: Low Medium High Supply Demand (H_2) έQ Oil Closed Nuclear Electric RES CCUS vehicles and gas Coal power Hydrogen Grids loop Raw materials 0 0 0 0 Technoloav 0 and equipment 0 0 Supply N/A N/A chain Shortage of skilled workforce End-to-end • High financing costs risks • Conservative practices of the regulators

1. In 2022, the percentage of imports substituted by domestic manufacturing was 60% in oil and gas, and 64% in coal mining

Source: Yakov and Partners analysis

Comments

Despite the sufficient supply of raw materials, there may be a deficit of certain critical inputs (such as lithium or rare earth metals)

The key risks are associated with access to advanced technology and equipment

To mitigate those risks, **imports of critical** equipment have to be substituted by domestic production,¹ particularly in LNG and thermal power generation

Less-than-reliable supply chains pose a high risk to fossil fuel exports, advancement of clean energy technologies (RES, NPP, hydrogen), and potential surges in demand for them

Debottlenecking options include design of comprehensive solutions and cross-sector collaboration arrangements in the energy sector for scaling up in the new markets and for other purposes

Infrastructure development to fuel domestic demand, particularly in the remote regions

SNPP (H_2) RES (H_2) Hydrogen •••• Northern Sea Route

RUB 1/kWh 2

3

7 >RUB 8/kWh

Electricity costs, flat rate for households, 2023



Energy projects

5

The Arctic and the Far East are currently experiencing a shortage of power generating capacity, which may exceed **1,500 MW by 2029**

The new RES and nuclear power projects in the pipeline will partially bridge the electricity supply gap

Nuclear power: small nuclear power plants to be put into operation by 2028 will have an aggregate capacity of **105 MW**

RES: close to 750 MW of solar power generating capacity by 2029 in Transbaikalia, and upwards of 1 GW of wind power capacity (with a prospect of exporting to China), new geothermal power projects in the pipeline for Kamchatka with a potential generating capacity of more than 2 GW

Sakhalin Region is to get a **hydrogen production site** by 2030 to produce as much as 36,500 t of blue hydrogen annually

Comments

The remote regions are a testing ground for trying out new technologies that cannot be competitive in central Russia

Gasification of coastal areas will become a more attractive proposition following the launch of year-round navigation on the Northern Sea Route

Development of SNPPs and RES (where feasible) will help to eliminate high fuel shipping costs

Sakhalin has the potential to emerge as an international cooperation hub for clean energy technology on account of its special economic zone status and geographic proximity to Asia-Pacific nations

Urgent advancement of new clean energy technologies: achieving a breakthrough by dint of economies of scale, made possible in part by international partnerships

New technology's potential in the energy transition context

3



By taking advantage of the new windows of opportunity, Russia will, on top of other benefits, build up the export potential of its energy sector with state-of-the-art technologies and solutions

Workforce training

Design end-to-end retraining and specialist training programs, targeting both Russian and international trainees

Financing

Take advantage of the
system for exportmaterialsIncentives, risk
insurance, and
subsidizing of tech-
intensive projectsLocalize materials
production processesSecure self-reliance
in resources at every
process stage

Technology and equipment

Assure the competitiveness of technologies developed in Russia Build reliable supply chains

Project implementation

Build a mix of sophisticated turn-key energy projects for export

Electric power generation

Put in place portfolio

solutions for low-

including nuclear

power

carbon generation,

Managing electric power storage and grid

> Develop world-class products for grid flexibility and energy storage with an eye on export opportunities going forward

Customer-side solutions

Commercialize smart digital solutions on the customer side (demand management)

Coordinated action is needed as part of the Russia Incorporated ecosystem

Supplies and raw



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)1 The energy landscape is changing: what's going on?

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Commercialization of new technology must be accelerated for Russia's energy sector to develop successfully

XX

Russia's energy sector in 2050

Domestic consumption

Critical energy equipment is manufactured in Russia

Robust supply chains are in place to underpin stable supply and demand

Domestic demand grows due to new natural gas- and nuclear power generating assets

New RES assets are added where this is economically viable

Export

Russia keeps export volumes high while diversifying the fuel mix and adding turn-key offers to its portfolio

Natural gas exports (including LNG) may increase by a factor of 2.4 by 2050, supplanting some of oil's export share

Emphasis is placed on high-tech and low-carbon energy carriers

The export potential is fulfilled for the new generation technologies that were beyond the commercial utilization horizon in 2023

Russia's share of the global energy mix



Russia

Rest of the world

Win-win moves and strategic bets for the Russian energy sector



Strategic bets

Expedited development of new technological solutions

- Investment in technology and new energy transition models: CCUS, hydrogen, electric vehicles, small nuclear power plants, microgrids
- Development of turn-key solutions for the domestic and international markets

Focus on long-term value

- Focus on environmentally friendly, low-carbon solutions
- Commitment to social responsibility principles in executive decision-making

Building the energy ecosystem of the future

- Giving due consideration to uncertainty factors, flexible decision-making
- Expanding the ecosystems, greater cooperation between competitors
- Transformation of the governance model

Focus on the "beneficial growth cycle"

Five steps toward success for the Russian energy sector

Scenario-based planning **Dynamic decision-making** Insights Simulating extreme but possible scenarios for the If dual-speed management is done Maximizing the strategic value of an asset or external environment over a long-term planning equity portfolio over a certain time horizon, right, Russia will be able **to** horizon, and "pulling" them close taking into account the emergence of contribute at least 8% to the global to the present day new technologies and potential energy mix by 2050. Technology exports will further augment the management impact global share of Russia's energy ()1 sector Innovative business model Focus on long-term Key focus areas for Russia include value development value chain localization in the energy sector to secure energy Giving priority to investment decisions geared Actively working toward building up a portfolio sovereignty, growth of domestic of new business opportunities, a shift toward toward creating long-term value for the demand, new technology competition at the level of ecosystems, company, the state, and society, development, and **partnerships** and converting that value to partnerships, and alliances, which may 03 shareholder value include direct rivals as members)4 "Run faster to stay in the marketplace": provided that the existing gaps are filled and ample Transformation of the governance model

Differentiated approach to the governance model

- Resource concentration to give impetus to cutting-edge competencies for the future
- Development of customer-centric verticals and flexible risk management
- Merciless cost-cutting by means of digitalization or otherwise



investment is made in new

technology, Russia is able not only

8% to its energy exports by 2050

to achieve a 16% increase in primary



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The Energy Transition: Challenges and Opportunities for Russia

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